BEYOND BOARDROOMS: A BRIEF EXPLORATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODELS

Drpljanin, Vildan

doi:10.69648/MOWZ3784

Апстракт

This article critically examines employee representation in corporate governance through a comparative global lens, focusing on two pri mary models: employee participation in governing bodies and share ownership. By analyzing the historical evolution and legal frameworks of corporate structures, this study explores the potential for fostering inclusive corporate environments that integrate employees into both decision-making and financial outcomes. Drawing on comparative exam ples from Germany, the United States, China, and the United Kingdom, the research investigates how different models of employee engagement influence organizational loyalty, job satisfaction, and productivity. Par ticular attention is given to the canvas of corporate landscape, where such models remain underdeveloped despite broad alignment with EU legal standards, such as the example of North Macedonia. This analysis highlights the need for legislative reform to incorporate effective em ployee engagement strategies tailored to North Macedonia’s economic and legal framework. By combining legal analysis with a comparative study, the paper provides recommendations for establishing resilient engagement models that could redefine corporate governance and en hance business resilience. These insights would bridge existing gaps in Macedonian and regional corporate law, fostering a more democratic, equitable, and worker-based corporate environment.

Клучни зборови

Референци

Addison, J. T., Teixeira, P., & Pahnke, A. (2017). The demise of a model? The state of collective bargaining and worker representation in Germany. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 38(1), 193–234.
Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62(5), 777–795. https://doi.org/10.1109/emr.1975.4306431
Biondi, Y., Canziani, A., & Kirat, T. (2007). The firm as an entity. Routledge.
Brouthers, K. D., & Bamossy, G. J. (1997). The role of key stakeholders in international parti cipation negotiations: Case studies from Eastern Europe. Journal of International Business Studies, 28(2), 285–308. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490102
Contractor, F. J., & Lorange, P. (Eds.). (1988). Cooperative strategies in international business. Lexington Books.
Davies, P. L., & Hopt, K. J. (2013). Corporate boards in Europe—Accountability and convergence. T he American Journal of Comparative Law, 61(2), 301–376. https://doi.org/10.5131/ajcl.2012.0020
Davis, G. F. (2008). A new finance capitalism? Mutual funds and ownership re-concentration in the United States. European Management Review, 5(1), 11–22. https://doi.org/10.1057/emr.2008.4
Davis, G. F. (2009). Managed by the market: How finance re-shaped America. Oxford University Press.
Delios, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2001). Survival and profitability: The roles of experience and in tangible assets in foreign subsidiary performance. Academy of Management Journal, 44(5), 1028–1038. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069446
Dhanaraj, C., Lyles, M. A., & Lai, Y. (2007). Innovation without walls: Alliance management at Eli Lilly and Company Inc. (Case No. 9B07M015). Ivey Publishing.
Ferreras, I. (2017). Firms as political entities: Saving democracy through economic bicameralism. Cambridge University Press.
Fey, C. F., & Beamish, P. W. (2001). Organizational climate similarity and performance. Organi zation Studies, 22(5), 853–882.
Freeman, R., & Lazear, E. (1995). An economic analysis of works councils. In J. Rogers & W. Streeck (Eds.), Works councils: Consultation, representation, and cooperation in industrial relations (pp. 27–52). University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226723792.001.0001
Ginglinger, E., Megginson, W., & Waxin, T. (2011). Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 868–883. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.03.005
Greenfield, K. (2004). Democracy and the dominance of Delaware in corporate law. Law and Contemporary Problems, 67, 135–152.
Grout, P. (1984). Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts: A Nash bargaining approach. Econometrica, 52, 449–460. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911498
Hansmann, H. (1990). When does worker ownership work? ESOPs, law firms, codetermination, and economic democracy. Yale Law Journal, 99, 1749–1797. https://digitalcommons.law. yale.edu/fss_papers/5037 https://doi.org/10.2307/796676
Hirschman, A. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and sta tes. Harvard University Press.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values. Sage.
Hofstede, G. (1991). Culture and organizations: Software of the mind. McGraw-Hill.
Hogan, C. (2001). Enforcement of implicit employment contracts through unionization. Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 171. https://doi.org/10.1086/209983
Honnold, J. O. (1995). Uniform laws for international trade: Early care and feeding for uniform growth. International Trade & Business Law Journal, 1, 1.
Koevski, G., & Spasevski, D. (2023). Employee participation – Obsolete or resurrected myth for better working of commercial companies, 54-77.
McDonnell, B. (2012). Strategies for an employee role in corporate governance. Wake Forest Law Review, 46, 429-452.
Neuman, G. L., & Roe, M. J. (1999). Third Frankfurt-Columbia Symposium on Comparative Law: Convergence and diversity in private and public law: Introduction to the symposium. Columbia Journal of European Law, 5(1), 183–189.
O’Connor, M. (2000). Employees and corporate governance: United States: Labor’s role in the American corporate governance structure. Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 22(Fall), 59-81.
Palladino, L. (2021). Economic democracy at work: Why (and how) workers should be represen ted on US corporate boards. Journal of Law and Political Economy, 1(3), 75-89. https://doi.org/10.5070/lp61353763
Parkinson, J. (1997). Company law and stakeholder governance. In A. Gamble & G. Kelly (Eds.), Stakeholder capitalism (p. 142). Macmillan Publishers.
Penrose, E. (1959). Theory of the growth of the firm. Oxford University Press.
Piketty, T. (2020). Capital and ideology. Harvard University Press.
Roberts, J., & van den Steen, E. (2003). Human capital and corporate governance. In J. Schwalba ch (Ed.), Corporate governance: Essays in honor of Horst Albach (2nd ed., pp. 126-142). Society for Economics and Management at Humboldt-University Berlin.
Scholz, R., & Vitols, S. (2019). Board-level codetermination: A driving force for corporate social responsibility in German companies? European Journal of Industrial Relations, 26(1), 233 249. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680119830566
Tsuk, D. (2003). Corporations without labor: The politics of progressive corporate law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151(6), 1861-1912. https://doi.org/10.2307/3313021
Vukadinović, R. (2012). International business. Kragujevac: Center for European Law Union.
Wartzman, R. (2017). The end of loyalty: The rise and fall of good jobs in America. Public Affairs.
Webber, D. H. (2014). The use and abuse of labor’s capital. New York University Law Review, 89, 2106-2125. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2380661
Weil, D. (2014). The fissured workplace: Why work became so bad for so many and what can be done to improve it. Harvard University Press.

Коментари

Сè уште нема коментари. Прашањата и забелешките за трудот се добредојдени.

[1] Addison, J. T., Teixeira, P., & Pahnke, A. (2017). The demise of a model? The state of collective bargaining and worker representation in Germany. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 38(1), 193–234.

[2] Alchian, A. A., & Demsetz, H. (1972). Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review, 62(5), 777–795. https://doi.org/10.1109/emr.1975.4306431

[3] Biondi, Y., Canziani, A., & Kirat, T. (2007). The firm as an entity. Routledge.

[4] Brouthers, K. D., & Bamossy, G. J. (1997). The role of key stakeholders in international parti cipation negotiations: Case studies from Eastern Europe. Journal of International Business Studies, 28(2), 285–308. https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8490102

[5] Contractor, F. J., & Lorange, P. (Eds.). (1988). Cooperative strategies in international business. Lexington Books.

[6] Davies, P. L., & Hopt, K. J. (2013). Corporate boards in Europe—Accountability and convergence. T he American Journal of Comparative Law, 61(2), 301–376. https://doi.org/10.5131/ajcl.2012.0020

[7] Davis, G. F. (2008). A new finance capitalism? Mutual funds and ownership re-concentration in the United States. European Management Review, 5(1), 11–22. https://doi.org/10.1057/emr.2008.4

[8] Davis, G. F. (2009). Managed by the market: How finance re-shaped America. Oxford University Press.

[9] Delios, A., & Beamish, P. W. (2001). Survival and profitability: The roles of experience and in tangible assets in foreign subsidiary performance. Academy of Management Journal, 44(5), 1028–1038. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069446

[10] Dhanaraj, C., Lyles, M. A., & Lai, Y. (2007). Innovation without walls: Alliance management at Eli Lilly and Company Inc. (Case No. 9B07M015). Ivey Publishing.

[11] Ferreras, I. (2017). Firms as political entities: Saving democracy through economic bicameralism. Cambridge University Press.

[12] Fey, C. F., & Beamish, P. W. (2001). Organizational climate similarity and performance. Organi zation Studies, 22(5), 853–882.

[13] Freeman, R., & Lazear, E. (1995). An economic analysis of works councils. In J. Rogers & W. Streeck (Eds.), Works councils: Consultation, representation, and cooperation in industrial relations (pp. 27–52). University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226723792.001.0001

[14] Ginglinger, E., Megginson, W., & Waxin, T. (2011). Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 17, 868–883. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.03.005

[15] Greenfield, K. (2004). Democracy and the dominance of Delaware in corporate law. Law and Contemporary Problems, 67, 135–152.

[16] Grout, P. (1984). Investment and wages in the absence of binding contracts: A Nash bargaining approach. Econometrica, 52, 449–460. https://doi.org/10.2307/1911498

[17] Hansmann, H. (1990). When does worker ownership work? ESOPs, law firms, codetermination, and economic democracy. Yale Law Journal, 99, 1749–1797. https://digitalcommons.law. yale.edu/fss_papers/5037 https://doi.org/10.2307/796676

[18] Hirschman, A. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and sta tes. Harvard University Press.

[19] Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values. Sage.

[20] Hofstede, G. (1991). Culture and organizations: Software of the mind. McGraw-Hill.

[21] Hogan, C. (2001). Enforcement of implicit employment contracts through unionization. Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 171. https://doi.org/10.1086/209983

[22] Honnold, J. O. (1995). Uniform laws for international trade: Early care and feeding for uniform growth. International Trade & Business Law Journal, 1, 1.

[23] Koevski, G., & Spasevski, D. (2023). Employee participation – Obsolete or resurrected myth for better working of commercial companies, 54-77.

[24] McDonnell, B. (2012). Strategies for an employee role in corporate governance. Wake Forest Law Review, 46, 429-452.

[25] Neuman, G. L., & Roe, M. J. (1999). Third Frankfurt-Columbia Symposium on Comparative Law: Convergence and diversity in private and public law: Introduction to the symposium. Columbia Journal of European Law, 5(1), 183–189.

[26] O’Connor, M. (2000). Employees and corporate governance: United States: Labor’s role in the American corporate governance structure. Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal, 22(Fall), 59-81.

[27] Palladino, L. (2021). Economic democracy at work: Why (and how) workers should be represen ted on US corporate boards. Journal of Law and Political Economy, 1(3), 75-89. https://doi.org/10.5070/lp61353763

[28] Parkinson, J. (1997). Company law and stakeholder governance. In A. Gamble & G. Kelly (Eds.), Stakeholder capitalism (p. 142). Macmillan Publishers.

[29] Penrose, E. (1959). Theory of the growth of the firm. Oxford University Press.

[30] Piketty, T. (2020). Capital and ideology. Harvard University Press.

[31] Roberts, J., & van den Steen, E. (2003). Human capital and corporate governance. In J. Schwalba ch (Ed.), Corporate governance: Essays in honor of Horst Albach (2nd ed., pp. 126-142). Society for Economics and Management at Humboldt-University Berlin.

[32] Scholz, R., & Vitols, S. (2019). Board-level codetermination: A driving force for corporate social responsibility in German companies? European Journal of Industrial Relations, 26(1), 233 249. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680119830566

[33] Tsuk, D. (2003). Corporations without labor: The politics of progressive corporate law. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151(6), 1861-1912. https://doi.org/10.2307/3313021

[34] Vukadinović, R. (2012). International business. Kragujevac: Center for European Law Union.

[35] Wartzman, R. (2017). The end of loyalty: The rise and fall of good jobs in America. Public Affairs.

[36] Webber, D. H. (2014). The use and abuse of labor’s capital. New York University Law Review, 89, 2106-2125. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2380661

[37] Weil, D. (2014). The fissured workplace: Why work became so bad for so many and what can be done to improve it. Harvard University Press.